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Introduction 
1. This submission sets out my personal views and does not represent the views of Northumbria 
University, RUSI, West Midlands PCC or West Midlands Police, or CDEI. 
2. The submission reflects my experience and research in respect of the use of AI and data analytics 
in the public sector. 
 
Legal frameworks and statutory gateways 
3. While the consultation focuses upon key aspects of the UK GDPR, a number of consultation 
questions (e.g. Q1.5.19, Q1.5.20) ask whether data protection is the appropriate legal framework to 
deal with the risks identified.   
4. In 2014, the Law Commission reported on its scoping project ‘Data Sharing Between Public Bodies’ 
(https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/data-sharing-between-public-bodies/).  It concluded that 
‘there are problems with the form of the law relating to data sharing that could usefully be 
addressed. We have also found evidence of problems which are not directly due to the form of the 
law, but could be alleviated by law reform.’ (para 1.3).  The Law Commission recommended (inter 
alia) that ‘a full law reform project should be carried out in order to create a principled and clear 
legal structure for data sharing, which will meet the needs of society…The project should include 
work to map, modernise, simplify and clarify the statutory provisions that permit and control data 
sharing and review the common law.’ (para 1.6)   
5. Since that date, the clarity of the situation has not improved.  Statutory ‘gateways’ have become 
increasingly common (such as ss 35, 40, Digital Economy Act 2017; clause 15 of the Police, Crime, 
Sentencing and Courts Bill, ‘Disclosure of Information’) with such provisions tending to disapply any 
obligations of confidence (such as those applying to medical information) whilst stating that the 
provision does not authorise any breach of the Data Protection Act.  
6. Such a siloed approach to relevant legal frameworks contributes to confusion, uncertainty and 
differing interpretations as to whether disclosures through such gateways are fair and therefore 
legal under data protection law or more generally, and/or whether disclosures other than by an 
explicit gateway are lawful. The increase in statutory gateways may on the one hand create the 
impression that explicit gateways are always necessary to share data (thus contributing to excessive 
caution) and on the other, suggest that data transfers can be ‘waved through’ because a gateway 
exists, without sufficient consideration given to other important legal principles contained within 
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human rights, equalities and administrative law (not mentioned in such gateways), in particular 
whether acquisition and subsequent use and analysis of the information is both necessary and 
proportionate.  The use of gateways can encourage focus on data disclosure and acquisition without 
equal attention being paid to how data is then used, including how the outputs of data analysis are 
deployed in public sector decision-making.  Subsequent use, including by way of analytics to 
produce further information (e.g. inferences or conclusions about individuals) often raise significant 
legal and ethical issues.  
7. The National Data Guardian has recently expressed her concern over the above-mentioned clause 
15 of the Bill: ‘People need to trust that they can share information in confidence with those 
responsible for their care without worrying how it will be used, by the police or others…Decisions 
about data use require not only expert data protection knowledge regarding what’s lawful, but 
practical and professional wisdom and experience to consider what would be ethical and right, 
balancing potential benefits against the avoidance of future harms.’ 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/data-driven-innovation-why-confidentiality-and-
transparency-must-underpin-the-nations-bright-vision-for-the-future-of-health-and-care)  
8.  The following diagram attempts to demonstrate the uncertainty that may still remain despite 
the use of statutory gateways (previously submitted to the 2013 Law Commission consultation): 
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9. Where disclosure is not mandated, a challenge for many public authorities will be to make a 
judgement on the reasons given by the acquiring authority for its acquisition and use of the data, in 
order to determine whether or not the disclosing authority has the power to disclose.  This may 
involve an element of second-guessing of the acquiring authority’s reasons for its request, a 
balancing exercise in respect of the potential impact of the disclosure on the holding authority’s own 
statutory functions and an assessment of the impact of the disclosure and data use on its own 
reputation.   
10. Connected to the above, one OMDDAC stakeholder reflected that ‘it’s not the law that’s been 
the problem; it’s the issue of shared responsibilities…In ninety-nine percent of situations data 
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protection law allows you to do what you want to do, provided the safeguards are there.’ 
(https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/final-report-omddac-lessons-learned/ fn 52)  These 
uncertainties also relate to the questions around further processing and legitimate interests 
identified in section 1.3 and 1.4 of the consultation. 
11. In my view, a ‘new direction’ purely focused on data protection will not be sufficient to 
appropriately govern new data-driven and algorithm-informed public sector decision-making.  It will 
be important to take a holistic approach to the key principles in all relevant legal frameworks 
(including human rights, administrative law, equalities law, data protection, regulation of intrusive 
and investigatory powers, law of evidence) ‘in order to create a principled and clear legal structure 
for data sharing’ as recommended by the Law Commission.  This is because personal data disclosure 
and acquisition is fundamentally connected to subsequent use, analysis and further disclosure of the 
results of such analysis, and the use of data analysis within the exercise of state power and 
discretion.  The principles of administrative law therefore govern (as they have done for many 
decades) the exercise of such power and discretion, already providing fundamental principles 
around the duty to give reasons (relevant to automated decision-making), relevant and irrelevant 
considerations and fettering discretion (see Oswald 2018 
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsta.2017.0359).  
12.  Taking such a holistic approach will provide opportunities to consider new ways of creating ‘a 
principled and clear structure for data sharing’ along with new ways of overseeing such sharing.  One 
possible solution to the issue of overlapping/conflicting/unclear statutory gateways (that I proposed 
previously in response to the Law Commission consultation) is a system of asymmetric gateways 
based on a hierarchy of statutory agencies (or public purposes) as laid out in the following diagram: 
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13. Such a hierarchical approach would provide an opportunity for a public conversation about the 
nature of each public function and the extent to which the transfer and use of personal data 
(especially sensitive data such as data about children, mobility data and identifiable medical 
information) is necessary and proportionate for each function, and therefore where each function 
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should be placed in the hierarchy.  Whilst the model describes a hierarchy of public bodies, perhaps 
the statutory function/purpose for which disclosure is proposed might be a better alternative. The 
outcome has the potential to create clarity over both the extent of data sharing and where the 
limitations should lie: the default position being that disclosure would permitted ‘up-hill’ subject to 
the acquirer justifying the necessity and proportionality and taking responsibility for the data and its 
use.  Disclosure would not be permitted ‘down-hill’ except in specified exceptional situations, such 
as those seen during the pandemic. 
14.  Research conducted through our OMDDAC project has highlighted the importance of avoiding 
assumptions about whether the public is comfortable with their data being shared across all 
sections of the public sector (i.e. avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to data-sharing).  For 
instance, our research has shown that survey participants were significantly less willing to share data 
with the police as compared with their local authority or public health body despite the emergency 
situation created by the pandemic (https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/final-report-omddac-lessons-
learned/, 24). 
Governance and oversight 
15.  It goes without saying that independent scrutiny and governance must therefore play a crucial 
role at all stages of such a hierarchical approach, which could contribute to increasing general 
transparency over the use of algorithms by the public sector.  The OMDDAC project concluded that 
there exists ‘a need for greater levels of transparency and public engagement with regard to the 
ways in which data is used. It is evident that there exist real public concerns around specific types of 
data sharing that need to be addressed directly and we encourage a new public conversation post 
pandemic to ensure that the public are better informed, educated and consulted regarding the use 
of their data. The views of young people – who have been described as ‘the hidden victims of COVID-
19’ – must also be incorporated into this conversation.’ (https://www.omddac.org.uk/news/final-
report-omddac-lessons-learned/, 6) 
16.  It will be crucial, as the digital environment becomes ever more complex, that scrutiny and 
governance is ‘end-to-end’ i.e. that scrutiny - and thus accountability - becomes a rolling process, 
from project planning/initiation to eventual operationalisation, rather than being limited to ex-post 
review.  New models of review and scrutiny will be needed, and lessons could be learned from the 
proceedings of the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner and West Midlands Police data 
ethics committee (the first of its kind in UK policing) which is an ongoing experiment in scrutinising 
and advising upon AI policing projects proposed for real operational environments.  I discuss these 
lessons, and the challenges for such an approach, in more detail at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3812576  
 
Dr Marion Oswald 
8 November 2021 
